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Heterogeneous effects of high school peers on educational outcomes
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between peers' abilities and educational outcomes at the end of high school
using data from the rich Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) matched to the National
Pupil Database of children in state schools in England. In particular, we focus on the effect of peers' abilities,
measured through achievements in Key Stage 3 (Age 14), on high powered test scores at Ages 16 and 18, and
on the probability of attending university. Our identification strategy is based on a measure of the peers of
peers' ability. In particular, for each individual, we look at her high school peers and select their primary school
peers who do not attend the same high school and who did not attend the same primary school as the
individual. We then use peers-of-peers ability, measured using Age 11 test scores as an instrument for high
school average peer ability, measured using Age 14 test scores. We also use quantile regression to explore the
effect of peers' ability on different parts of the distributions of the outcomes. Our results show that average of
peers' abilities has a moderate positive effect on test scores at Ages 16 and 18, and that being in a school with a
large proportion of low-quality peers can have a significantly detrimental effect on individual achievements.
Furthermore, peers' ability seems to have a stronger effect on students at the bottom of the grade distribution,
especially at Age 16.
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The analysis of peer effects in education has received increasing attention among economists and 
applied social scientists in recent years (see, e.g., the recent review by Sacerdote, 2011). A number 
of studies (Angrist and Lang, 2004; Lavy et al., 2012; Gibbons and Telhaj, 2015, among others) 
typically find modest but statistically significant peer effects in test scores. In addition, there is 
some evidence that heterogeneous peer effects exist. In particular, Burke and Sass (2013) and Ding 
and Lehrer (2007) find that high-ability students benefit from other high-ability students while Im-
berman et al. (2012) find that good peers have positive effects which are greatest for low-achieving 
students. 
 The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between peer ability and individual 
attainment levels in high-stakes educational tests at the end of compulsory schooling at Age 16 and 
at the end of high school at Age 18 using a rich and recent dataset of English teenagers. Estimating 
the size of peer effects is important because they imply that educational interventions may have 
multiplier effects (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 2003), i.e., that the impact of an educational 
intervention may self-propagate within a group of students. Furthermore, we devote a substantial 
focus on the potential heterogeneity in the effect of peer ability because such a feature has efficien-
cy implications for the mixing of pupils in a school or in a classroom. An ideal student mix may 
raise the average scholastic attainment of a group in ways which other educational interventions 
may not be able to achieve. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature on peer effects in education in three main 
ways. First, we provide evidence based on a recent dataset of English teenagers, and we focus our 
attention on high-stakes educational outcomes at the end of high school. The existing literature 
based on British data mostly analyse the impact of peers on junior high school achievement at 
Age 14 (Lavy et al., 2012; Gibbons and Telhaj, 2015). Second, we investigate the existence of het-
erogeneous peer effects across the grade distribution. 
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 We contribute further to the literature by estimating peer effects using a novel identification 
strategy to overcome the reflection problem and mitigate selection bias. Based on the outcomes of 
the “peers of one’s peers”, we use information on the primary school peers of an individual’s high 
school peers who satisfy two conditions: first, they must have attended a different primary school 
from the student of interest; and, second, they must not be in the same high school as the student of 
interest. This information is used as an instrument for an individual’s average peer ability in high 
school. The idea is that some of the peers of any specific high school student will have had primary 
school peers who have never been directly exposed to the student in question because they went to a 
different primary and high school. Therefore, these peers could never have had a direct effect on the 
student’s outcomes, although we explore the possibility of indirect effects. 
 In many countries, sorting of pupils between schools on the basis of family socioeconomic 
status and other characteristics exists. Peer effects in this context may amplify existing disparities 
between groups of students, with high-achieving students benefiting from each other while low-
ability students impair each other’s learning. Differentiation may further occur within and between 
schools through streaming or tracking. Those who support segregation by ability within schools 
suggest that teaching might be more efficient if it is tailored to homogeneous ability groups (see 
Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles (2005) for a thoughtful discussion on this issue). However, concerns 
have been raised about these practices as they might lead to increased inequality of opportunities, 
especially for students who come from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds and are thus 
likely to be in the bottom of the grade distribution (Bradley and Taylor 2008). Peer effects may then 
consequently reinforce disadvantage. 
 The analysis of peer effects is important for reasons in addition to the multiplier effect. First, 
it is a very critical issue for educational policies related to the expansion of school choice. Choices 
related to peers’ composition may lead to some differentiation across schools based on students’ 
ability (Epple and Romano, 2000). In Britain, like in many other countries, school choice depends 
mostly on place of residence and catchment areas, and then subsequently on parental choice and 
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academic selection. The combination of these factors results in large variations in the pupil mix 
within schools (Atkinson et al., 2008).  Second, educational policies might be needed to be tailored 
differently depending on the relevance of peer effects. These interventions can be more (or less) 
effective when targeting individuals or specific groups within a school. Lastly, if peer effects are 
heterogeneous, this can have implications on the importance of carefully mixing students across 
different ability groups, as average individual achievements can be influenced by the mix of peers 
and not just by their average achievement. 
 However, identifying the effect of peers’ ability on individual achievements is particularly 
complicated from an empirical point of view for several reasons (Angrist, 2014). First, peer groups 
are not exogenous and they are, to a certain extent, self-selected. For example, children attending 
the same school are likely to have some common unobserved characteristics, perhaps related to the 
area in which they live and the socioeconomic background of their families. The correlation be-
tween these factors and both the educational outcomes and the nature of the peer group might lead 
to an overestimation of the effect of peers’ ability because of positive selection bias.  
 Second, individuals affect their own peer group as much as the peer group affects them, so 
peers’ achievements are not exogenous with respect to individual educational outcomes, especially 
when pupils have been together for a while. Students’ learning is affected by direct contact and so-
cial interaction, and individual achievements are likely to be correlated with those of other students 
in the same class or school. This mechanism is known as the “reflection problem” (Manski, 1993). 
If this is not properly taken into account, estimation results cannot be credible. 
 We use data from a recent and rich dataset – the Longitudinal Study of Young People in 
England (LSYPE), which includes a variety of information on the child, the family, and the school. 
The existing literature in the UK mostly relies on the National Pupil Database (NPD), which has a 
very limited set of family background characteristics. Our results suggest that peer ability has a 
moderate effect on test scores at Age 16 and 18, but it does not significantly affect the likelihood of 
attending university. Furthermore, peer ability seems to have a stronger effect on students at the 
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bottom of the grade distribution, especially at Age 16. These findings are consistent with the exist-
ing evidence from nonexperimental studies on peer effects. We thus complement it by providing 
new results based on a new and quasi-experimental identification strategy. 
 The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief overview of 
the existing literature. We present the data and explain the peer-ability indicators and outcomes in 
Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, we discuss the estimation methods and the results, respectively. Fi-
nally, we conclude in Section 6 with a discussion of policy implications. 
2. Related literature 
Researchers have been interested in the analysis of peer effects on a variety of outcomes, including 
health-risky behaviours (McVicar and Polanski, 2014; Trogdon et al., 2008), and a number of aca-
demic and educational outcomes (Zimmerman, 2003; Hanushek et al., 2003; Carrell, 2009; Duflo et 
al., 2011; Lavy et al., 2012; Gibbons and Telhaj, 2015). However, estimating peer effects is compli-
cated by what Manski (1993) refers to as the “reflection problem”, which makes it difficult for an 
empirical researcher to disentangle the specific effect of peers’ achievements on the individual. 
 Manski (1993) distinguishes between the three non-exclusive channels through which indi-
viduals may have characteristics and outcomes similar to their peer group: via the endogenous ef-
fect, via exogenous effects (also called contextual effects), and via correlated effects. In our context, 
an endogenous effect arises if the individual’s achievement varies with the average achievement of 
the peer (or reference) group; an exogenous effect arises if the individual’s achievement varies with 
the observable socioeconomic characteristics of the peer group; and correlated effects arise if the 
individual has similar achievements as her peers because they are subject to similar shocks. For 
policy purposes, there is a tendency to emphasise the estimation of the endogenous effect as this 
generates the social multiplier which allows an intervention’s effects to self-propagate within a 
group (Angrist, 2014) 
 Researchers have applied several different techniques to overcome these empirical prob-
lems: including random assignment (e.g., Carrell et al., 2009, and Duflo et al., 2011); exploiting 
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within-school random variation (e.g., Lavy and Schlosser, 2011; accounting for school and pupil 
fixed effects (e.g., Lavy et al., 2012, and Gibbons and Telhaj, 2015, among others); using instru-
mental variables (e.g., Goux and Maurin, 2007), and the network of “friends of friends” (as in Mo-
riarty et al., 2012). Most studies find relatively small effects, and the evidence about the heterogene-
ity of peer effects is both thin and mixed. For example, Imberman et al. (2012) find that good peers 
have positive effects which are greatest for low-achieving students, and Lavy et al. (2012) find that 
low-achieving students are most adversely affected by an increase in the share of bad peers. In con-
trast, Burke and Sass (2013) for the US, and Ding and Lehrer (2007) for China, show that high 
achievers benefit most from increases in peer quality. For Kenya, Duflo et al. (2011) report positive 
peer-ability effects on achievement growth, especially for high achievers. 
 A number of studies have analysed the impact of peers’ ability on outcomes in higher educa-
tion, such as college grades and graduation, exploiting the random allocation in college accommo-
dation in the US (Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Foster, 2006; Winston and Zimmerman 
2004; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2006; Carrell et al., 2009). For example, famously, Sacer-
dote (2001) uses the random allocation of students in dormitories at Dartmouth College to show that 
peers have an effect on students’ grades. Similarly, Carrell et al. (2009) uses the random assignment 
of students at the United States Air Force Academy to show substantial nonlinear peer effects, find-
ing that these effects are higher at the bottom of the grade distribution. 
 More relevant to our purposes are those studies that analyse the effect of peers’ ability on 
educational achievements in school. Some studies have looked at primary school children and have 
exploited several different strategies to analyse the impact of peers in early ages (e.g., Hoxby, 2000; 
Hanushek et al., 2003; Angrist and Lang, 2004; Lefgre, 2004; Ammermueller and Pischke, 2006; 
Vigdor and Nexhyba, 2007; Goux and Maurin, 2007). Hanushek et al. (2003) use data from the 
Texas Assessment of Academic Skills, and control for fixed school, individual, and school-by-grade 
effects to show that peers’ achievements have a positive effect on individual grades, and that this 
effect is constant across quartiles of the grade distribution. Similarly, Lefgren (2004) uses data from 
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Chicago public schools and examine peer effects using school tracking policies. The author shows 
that peer effects are quite small but generally positive and significant. Angrist and Lang (2004) ana-
lyse the results of the METCO program in Boston, which sends black disadvantaged students to 
public schools in high-socioeconomic-status areas, and they indicate that there is limited evidence 
of statistically significant effects. 
 A distinct strand of the literature examines peer effects in middle and secondary schools. 
These studies mostly show small but significant peer effects (e.g., Kang, 2007;  Lavy et al., 2007; 
Schindler Rangvid, 2008; Calvo-Armengol et al., 2009). In the UK, Bradley and Taylor (2008) es-
timate peer effects using information on pupils changing schools in the last two years of their com-
pulsory education. They show that peer effects exist and are stronger for low-ability students and 
non-white children. However, pupils who change school may be systematically different from those 
who do not change, especially when the reasons for the change can be related to school achieve-
ments. In addition, Atkinson et al. (2008) use a panel of schoolchildren from the southwest of Eng-
land to look at the effect of the introduction of teachers’ performance related pay in England, and 
show significant and non-trivial peer effects conditioning for school and teacher fixed effects. 
 The studies that are closest to ours are Lavy et al. (2012), and Gibbons and Telhaj (2015). 
Both papers exploit the change in peers from primary to high school and use the National Pupil Da-
tabase (NPD) to analyse the effect of peer ability measured at the end of primary school through 
Key Stage 2 examinations (at Age 11) and on achievements at the beginning of high school, meas-
ured through Key Stage 3 exams (at Age 14). Lavy et al. (2012) use within-pupil and cross-subject 
regressions, and exploit the variation in achievements by subject to show negative effects arising 
from bad peers but little effect of the average peer quality of the good peers. Gibbons and Telhaj 
(2015) exploit year-to-year changes in secondary school peer group, and account for fixed effects 
for both primary and high school attended. Their work shows small and significant peer effects as 
well as complementarities between peers with different ability levels. 
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 Our strategy to overcome the reflection problem and mitigate the impact of selection bias is 
based on the outcomes of the peers of one’s peers. These peers went to a different primary and high 
school. Therefore, these peers could never have had a direct effect on the student’s outcomes in the 
sense of being in the same classroom or, indeed, the same school. We demonstrate a strong first-
stage relationship between a student’s average peer ability and the peers-of-peers ability, and we 
use the latter as an instrument for the former to estimate the causal impacts of average peer ability 
on individual scholastic outcomes. 
3. Data 
3.1 Institutional background 
Education in England is organised in Key Stages (KS). Children enter primary school at 4–5 years 
old, and move to Key Stage 1 (at Age 6–7). Key Stage 2 starts at Age 7–8, and lasts until Age 10–
11 (Year 6) when children leave primary education and enter secondary school. At this point, Key 
Stage 3 starts (Age 11–14), followed by Key Stage 4 (Age 14–16). At the end of Key Stage 4, stu-
dents take the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) which coincides with the end of 
compulsory schooling. 
 Local Educational Authorities (LEA) are responsible for organizing their admission policies 
for primary and secondary schools. Government schools cannot select students on the basis of their 
ability, even if some studies have suggested that schools find ways to select students on the basis of 
parental characteristics that might be correlated with ability (West and Hind 20030. Our sample 
includes over 640 high schools and over 82 percent of them are government comprehensive schools 
while voluntary-aided or -controlled schools (usually those schools with a religious denomination) 
account for 15 percent. 
Parents are free to choose any school they prefer, but when schools have a number of appli-
cants which is higher than the available places, they allocate places according to some additional 
criteria. Usually, looked-after children and children with special needs have priority, followed by 
children who have siblings in the same school, and then children living in the area with proximity as 
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the tie-breaker. As noted in Gibbons et al. (2013), most households can choose between more than 
one school from their area of residence and on average, students in the same cohort living in the 
same neighbourhood attend just one of a handful of different local secondary schools. Further, a 
typical English secondary school is attended by pupils living in more than 60 Output Areas, the 
smallest proxy for neighbourhood (Gibbons et al., 2013). 
 In secondary schools, students are grouped with different peers for different subjects, so 
they do not have a unique “class” for all subjects. Furthermore, students are sometimes taught in 
groups of similar ability (determined after an initial observation period) for some subjects – alt-
hough not all schools “set” by ability, and that this varies by subject, with a higher prevalence of 
ability setting for Mathematics and Science and a lower incidence for English (Kutnick et al., 2006). 
Some GCSE examinations are organised in “tiers” and different students sit a different test depend-
ing on their ability group, so that the maximum grade that they can achieve depends on their allo-
cated tier. 
3.2 Dataset 
The LSYPE dataset is managed by the UK Department of Education and covers a wide range 
of topics, including family relationships, attitudes toward school, family and labour market, and 
some more sensitive or challenging issues, such as risky health behaviours, personal relationships, 
etc. Young people included in LSYPE were selected to be representative of all young people in 
England but, at the same time, the survey oversampled specific groups (and, in particular, young 
people from a low socioeconomic background). The survey started when these adolescents were in 
Year 9 in 2004 at the age of 14. The records of LSYPE children can be linked to the NPD, a pupil-
level administrative database of all English pupils including detailed information on pupil test 
scores and achievements, as well as school characteristics. We use this data to collect information 
about LSYPE children’s results in test scores at Ages 11, 14, and 16, which is the minimum school-
leaving age for this cohort. This occurs at the end of a stage of the national curriculum known as 
KS4, and culminates in the GCSEs exams. 
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 In the first wave of LSYPE, around 15,000 young people were interviewed across more than 
700 high schools. On average, data were collected for 27 students in each school. In the first four 
waves, parents or guardians were also interviewed. Our final sample includes 9,213 observations of 
children with non-missing information on test scores at ages 11, 14 and 16, peers’ test scores, and 
other essential information on the child’s family background. The selected observations were not 
significantly different from the original data in terms of their observable characteristics. 
3.3      Outcomes 
We are interested in analysing the effect of peers’ ability on academic outcomes at the end of high 
school and on the chances that a young person will take further studies after compulsory education. 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for our outcome variables. We analyse peer effects on 
attainment in GCSE tests at Age 16. At the end of KS4 (from 13 to 16 years old), pupils generally 
take the national public GCSEs in most subjects studied (often in as many as ten subjects).  GCSE 
grades range from A* to G. Our dependent variables include the number of subjects with “pass” 
grades (A*–C) in GCSE exams (Figure 1 shows the distribution), and a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the child has five GCSE passes including Mathematics and English, which is usually required for 
students following an academic track for progression beyond Age 16 into senior high school. Ta-
ble 1 shows that more than half of the adolescents in the sample achieved five or more GCSE exams 
with a grade between A* and C, and 42% take A-level exams. Of those who stay in education after 
age 16, 35% attend university and, within this subsample, 20% attend an institution that is part of 
the Russell Group of institutions that is regarded as being elite.1 
                                                            
1 The Russell Group consists of the following 24 institutions: Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, Durham, 
Edinburgh, Exeter, Glasgow, Imperial College, King's College, Leeds, Liverpool, LSE, Manchester, Newcastle, 
Nottingham, Oxford, Queen Mary College, Queen’s Belfast,  Sheffield, Southampton, UCL, Warwick, and York. 
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Figure 1     Distribution of Number of GCSE’s with Grade A*-C 
 
Table 1      Descriptive Statistics of Outcome Variables 
Educational Outcomes Mean (Std. Dev.)
Has 5 or more GCSE with A*–C incl. English and Maths 52.16% 
Number of GCSEs with A*–C 6.44 (4.17) 
Has A levels 42.02% 
A-levels points  | Has A levels 247.98 (132.77) 
Has A level in Maths 9% 
A-level points in Maths | A level in Maths 112.5 (52.74) 
Has A level in Science  12% 
A-level points in Science | A level in Science 132.894 (70.21) 
Attending university 29.6% 
Attending a Russell Group university | conditional on attending university 23% 
Note.—A-level points are counted as 100 for Grade A, 80 for B, 60 for C, 40 for D, and 20 for E. 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of A-level scores. We also explore the impact of the propor-
tion of low achieving peers, on the students’ performance in Mathematics and Science at A levels. 
As noted in Mendolia and Walker (2014), the determinants of performance in a particular subject 
(rather than overall school performance) are very hard to disentangle. It is particularly interesting to 
analyse peer effects in performance in these subjects, as the UK ranking of 15-year-old pupils in 
Mathematics and Science in the OECD’s PISA tests has been constantly falling from 2000 to 2009. 
Furthermore, the UK has one of the lowest shares of 15-year olds intending to pursue a STEM ca-
reer among the OECD countries and particularly lags behind in women’s aspirations to study a 
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Figure 2     Distribution of Number of A-Level Scores 
 
Finally, we analyse the effect of peers’ ability on the probability of being enrolled at univer-
sity at Age 19–20 and on chances to attend a Russell Group institution. 
3.4       Peers’ ability 
We analyse the effect of peers’ ability on individual educational outcomes at the end of high school. 
Peers’ ability is measured through average achievements in KS3 tests (taken at Age 14) for children 
who attended the same high school of each LSYPE child. 
 Furthermore, we follow the literature on peer effects in education (e.g., Lavy et al., 2012) 
and investigate the effect of low-achieving peers in high school, in order to analyse whether a large 
fraction of “bad peers” is significantly detrimental for students’ learning. To do so, we use the in-
formation on the percentage of students not achieving basic standards (called Level 5) in KS3 
Mathematics. Figure 4 presents the distribution of this variable. Over 50% of schools in the estima-
tion sample have a percentage of students not achieving basic standards in Maths below 30% and, 
















Figure 4 Distribution of Percentage of Students Not Achieving Basic Standard Mathematics 
 
 As we have already discussed, peers’ ability is endogenous as people from the same peer 
group share common unobserved characteristics and because individuals might affect their peer 
group inasmuch as their peer group affects them. Therefore, we rely on a novel identification strate-
gy based on the peers of peers. In practice, for each LSYPE child, we look at her high school peers, 
and then we select her primary school peers who did not attend the same primary school as she did 
and do not currently attend the same high school. These individuals are likely to have affected the 
peers (through attendance of the same primary school) but have likely never met the student of in-
terest. Therefore, these peers of peers cannot have had a direct effect on the student’s achievements. 
 Our analysis is limited to children who are in LSYPE, and, consequently, we do not have a 
complete overview of all students in a particular primary or high school and our estimates could 
potentially be affected by measurement error for this reason. However, the LSYPE sample was de-
signed to be representative of various subgroups of the students’ population in England, and using 
students in LSYPE allows us to access to all the available information on their families and back-
grounds (which are not included in NPD). Peers-of-peers ability is measured through achievements 
in KS2 tests taken at the end of primary school at Age 11. 
 Our sample is composed of over 9,200 individuals, who come from 640 high schools and 
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(in LSYPE) who come from many different primary schools (from two to 23 primary schools). The 
vast majority of high schools (around 80%) draw their students from a group of 8 to 14 primary 
schools. Therefore, the size of the peers-of-peers group varies from one to 97 children, and table 3 
shows that over 70 percent of LSYPE children having a peers-of-peers group of three or more stu-
dents (see Table 2). 
Table 2      Peer of Peers Group Size 
Number of Peers Percent of LSYPE Children 
1 peer of peers 10 
2 peers of peers 18 
3–4 peers of peers 10 
5–7 peers of peers 10 
8–10 peers of peers 12 
11–15 peers of peers 12 
15+ peers of peers 28 
 
3.5 Other independent variables 
We estimate three versions of our model, progressively increasing the number of covariates. The 
independent variables included in the model should not be affected by peers’ ability. In the first 
specification of the model, we control for a basic set of individual and family characteristics, in-
cluding child’s gender and achievement in the KS2 test (Age 11), maternal education and marital 
status, and employment status of both parents (Wave 4 – Age 17). In the second specification, we 
add the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) score, which is a measure derived from income, em-
ployment, health and disability, education, housing, crime, and living environment. Lastly, in the 
final specification of the model, we control for individual ethnic background and for some school 
characteristics, such as government region, number of students, religious denomination, and the 
gender mix of the school. 
4 Estimation 
We begin our analysis by estimating a linear-in-means model of peer effects: 
 ̅ , (1)
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where  represents a particular academic outcome for individual  who has attended primary 
school  and is now attending high school . We define ’s high school peers as those currently 
attend high school  but have attended a variety of primary schools apart from school . The varia-
ble ̅  is the average ability (measured by KS3 score) for LSYPE children attending high school  
excluding the individual (the “leave-one-out” mean), and  is a vector of child and family charac-
teristics. We lower the likely upper bound provided by OLS estimation through the inclusion of a 
very detailed set of independent variables in  (see Section 3.4).  
The parameter of interest is , which captures the relationship between average peer ability 
̅  and individual achievements  at the end of junior high school and beyond: that is, GCSE 
results, A-level results, and the probability of going to university. This represents the endogenous 
effect in the terminology of Manski (1993) and, if significant, generates the social multiplier effect. 
To account for the endogeneity of average peer ability in Equation (1), we use instrumental-
variable estimation, with peers-of-peers ability in primary school (measured through their achieve-
ments at KS2 level at Age 11) as an instrument for the average high school peer ability (measured 
through KS3 results at Age 14). Our first-stage equation is 
 ̅ , (2) 
where the average high school peer ability ̅  depends on the peers-of-peers average performance 
 in primary school (KS2 score) of those who attended primary schools  and currently attending 
high school , where . The underlying assumption is that the ability of the high school stu-
dents’ peers-of-peers in primary school did not affect the high schools’ student achievements direct-
ly except through its impact on the student’s current peers in high school. 
 One natural concern in the estimation of this model is that selection of secondary schools on 
the basis of unobservables could be driving the main findings. Parents choose the school for their 
children (or at least the area where they live) and, thus, individuals who attend the same high school 
are likely to have some common background characteristics. However, our instrument relies on 
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peers of peers who do not attend the same high school as the individual and did not attend the same 
primary school. The vast majority of high schools have more than eight primary school feeders, as 
shown in Section 3, and therefore peers of peers (who now attend a different high school) are likely 
to have come from an area with different socioeconomic characteristics. Furthermore, previous lit-
erature has shown that neighbourhood composition has a very limited effect on test scores once one 
controls for family socioeconomic characteristics (Gibbons et al., 2013), and we believe that our 
rich data allow us to take into consideration a wide set of these factors. 
 In the model estimation explained so far, we have assumed that peer effects are homogene-
ous in the sense that the relationship between peers’ ability and individual achievements is the same 
for each student. However, peer effects are likely to be heterogeneous and vary according to the 
individual ability of students. For example, peer ability might have stronger effects on weak stu-
dents than on strong students or vice versa; or the presence of a group of weak students might have 
different effects on weak students than on strong ones (see, e.g., Kong 2007). 
 We use quantile regression to examine the potential heterogeneous effects of peer ability at 
different points of the achievement distributions. We estimate the effect of the average peer ability 
for students at different quantiles of the GCSE and A-level score distributions. In order to deal with 
the endogeneity of peer ability in high school, we use IV quantile regression (Chernozhukov et al., 
2010; Chernozhukov et al., 2015; Lee, 2007) which has been used in a similar context in Kong 
(2007). The analysis is performed using the Stata routine cqiv with the uncensored option (Cher-
nozhukov et al., 2011). A parametric version of the estimator proposed by Lee (2007) is used in the 
estimation. In particular, following Lee (2007), the following model is estimated: 
	 	 | , | , ̅ ,     (3) 
and the first step linear quantile regression is modelled as 
̅ | | ,       (4) 
where and  can be estimated by a th quantile regression of  on ̅ and .  
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Furthermore, we follow Lavy et al. (2012) and estimate the effect of having low-ability 
peers in high school. To do so, we use the information on the percentage of students not achieving 
basic standard (called Level 5) in KS3 Mathematics which is available in the LSYPE dataset for 
each high school. In order to deal with the potential endogeneity of this variable, we apply the same 
strategy as in the previous model and instrument it with a variable indicating the percentage of stu-
dents not achieving basic standards in KS2 Mathematics in peers-of-peers primary schools. 
5 Results 
Our main results are presented in Tables 3–16. We begin by presenting results from the least-
squares estimation of the relationship between average peer ability and individual achievements in 
Table 3. When we progressively increase the set of control variables, including additional character-
istics related to the socioeconomic status of the family and the area of residence, our main results 
are unchanged.2 Model 2 includes the same variables as in Model 1, but also includes the Index of 
Multiple Deprivation score, which captures several dimensions of socioeconomic disadvantage such 
as income, education, housing, health, etc. It is important to show the stability of our main results 
when controlling for this variable, as it is well-known that family socioeconomic status is a strong 
predictor of educational achievements later in life. 
 Table 3 presents results from Model 1 from OLS and IV estimations, including the basic set 
of individual and family characteristics. Unsurprisingly, OLS results are highly significant and sug-
gest that improving peer ability has a positive effect on individual achievements at Age 16–17 
(GCSE exams) and Age 17–18 (A-level exams); the sizes of the effect are nontrivial. When we take 
into account the potential endogeneity of peer ability via IV estimation, most results have similar 
size and significance and confirm the OLS findings. Interestingly, we do not find any significant 
effect of peer ability on the chances to attend university and to get into an elite higher education 
institution when we use IV estimation – which might suggest that the more able students are rela-
                                                            
2 We also tested our main results by including an additional indicator of economic disadvantage of the primary school 
attended (such as percentage of students eligible for free school meal). The substantive results were unaffected. 
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tively insensitive to their less-able peers. Our instrument relies on peers-of-peers test scores in pri-
mary school to estimate peer ability in high school, and it is possible that we do not see any signifi-
cant effect on long-term outcomes because of the specific nature of the instrument and because the 
effect has faded over time. Results from first-stage regressions are reported in the Appendix (Tables 
15–16). 
Model 2 is more precise than Model 1, as it includes controls for the IMD score and it al-
lows taking into consideration a broad indicator of family socioeconomic status and area of resi-
dence. As shown in Table 3, results from Model 2 corroborate the main findings from Model 1, 
especially in relation to the impact of peer quality on A-level results. A one-standard-deviation in-
crease in the average peers of peers KS3 increases individual chances of taking A-levels by about 
8 percentage points and the average A-level score by about 56 points, which is equivalent to 40 per-
cent of an s.d. These results are consistent in terms of size and significance when we use IV estima-
tion and strongly support the idea that peer ability plays a substantial role in a student’s decision to 
continue in education after GCSE and on her performance. 
 When we add the IMD score and estimate results in Model 2, the impact of peer ability on 
performance at GCSE level (Age 16–17) is not statistically significant in the IV estimation. Howev-
er, this could simply be due to the fact that the effect of peer ability on individual achievements is 
heterogeneous, and peer ability has a stronger impact on students with particular characteristics or 
ability level. We thus estimate the model using quantile-regression techniques in order to investi-
gate heterogeneous effects of peers’ ability on GCSE and A-level results. 
 Table 4 presents results from the estimation of the effect of low-achieving peers. The results 
indicate that the effect of being in a school with a high proportion of peers who do not achieve basic 
standards is sizeable and significantly negative on individual achievements. An extra 10 percent of 
peers not achieving basic standards in Maths decreases individual chances of taking A-levels by 
about 2 percent and decreases A-level scores by about 22 points (16 percent of an s.d.). These re-
sults are consistent with Lavy et al. (2012), who show that a 10-percent decrease in the proportion 
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of “bad” peers at school is associated with an improvement of approximately 10–11 percent of an 
s.d. of the within-pupil KS3 distribution for students. 
As explained in Section 4, so far we have assumed that peer effects affect achievements in 
the same way for all students. However, it is possible that some students suffer (or benefit) more 
from their peers’ ability and in particular, it is possible that weaker students are more heavily influ-
enced by their peers’ behaviour and achievements in class. For this reason, we follow Kang (2007) 
and use quantile regressions in order to analyse the potential heterogeneity of peers’ interaction. 
The potential endogeneity of peers’ ability is taken into account by using quantile instrumental vari-
able regression. 
 Results from the estimation of Model 2 using quantile regression are reported in Tables 5–
10. Our results confirm the main findings in previous literature (e.g., Kang, 2007; and Carrell et al., 
2009) and show that peer effects are stronger at the bottom of the grade distribution. In particular, 
Table 6 shows that a one-standard-deviation increase in average peers’ KS3 score increases the 
number of GCSE A*–C by 0.93, and by 0.78 in Model 2 for students in the 10th and 15th  percentile 
of the GCSE distribution, while the effect is lower and then vanishes for students at the top of the 
grade distribution. This effect is sizeable, especially considering that students in these bottom per-
centiles are particularly weak, as they only achieve an average of 0.5 GCSE passes while the aver-





Table 3 OLS and IV estimates of the impact of average peers’ quality on academic achievement 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Outcomes OLS IV F OLS IV F OLS IV F 


























































































Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables in-





Table 4 OLS and IV estimates of the impact of % of students not achieving basic standards in KS3 Mathematics on academic achievements 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Outcomes OLS IV F OLS IV F OLS IV F 




























































































Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables in-
cluded are listed at p.14-15. 
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Results from the estimation of quantile regression on the effect of low ability peers strongly 
confirm that increasing the percentage of low ability peers is significantly detrimental for students 
at the bottom of the GCSE grade distribution. An extra 10 percent of high school peers who do not 
achieve basic standards in Mathematics decrease the number of GCSEs at passing A*–C grades by 
about 0.3 for students in the 20th percentile of the grade distribution, while the effect is significantly 
smaller and then vanishes for top students. 
Interestingly, we do not see such a clear pattern with respect to A-level results, and students 
from the whole of the grade distribution seem to benefit from increased peers’ quality in a similar 
way, and the effect of low-ability peers is also consistent across the grade distribution. This differ-
ence with respect to GCSE results might be partially due to the fact that students who undertake A-
levels will usually study in a different school (often a Sixth Form College) from the one they at-
tended in the junior high years, so this model is actually estimating the effect of “past peers”, as we 
rely on peers at the beginning of high school. Furthermore, A-level exams require a higher level of 
preparation than GCSEs, and it is possible that the quality of high school peers has a stronger effect 
on the students’ preparation at this higher level. 
All our main findings are confirmed when we estimate Model 3, including a wider set of in-
dependent variables and some school characteristics. The pattern of results is unchanged and we 
notice a strong effect of peers’ quality on chances to take A-levels and on A-levels score, as well as 
a significant effect on students in the bottom quartile of the GCSE grade distribution.  
We further investigate the impact of low ability peers and estimate the effect of the propor-
tion of peers not achieving basic standards in Maths on the probability of taking A-levels in Math-
ematics or Science3 and on the A-level points in these subject. These results are presented in Ta-
ble 11 and show that having studied in a high school with an extra 10 percent of low-ability peers 
                                                            
3 We group the following subjects under ‘‘Science’’: Biology, Chemistry, Physics (and any combination of two of these 
three subjects), Environmental Science, Psychology (as a Science), Technology, Zoology, Meteorology, Engineering 
Science, and Other Science. 
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decrease the probability of taking A-level in Maths or Science by about 3–4 percentage points, and 
decrease the A-level points in these subjects by about 9–10 percent of an s.d.  
 We test our main results using three sensitivity analyses. First, we re-estimate the model 
excluding observations from smaller than average high schools (with less than 600 students).4 Large 
schools will typically draw from a larger number of junior schools and this is likely to lessen the 
problem associated with socioeconomic sorting in primary schools (see Appendix, Table 12). Sec-
ondly, we re-estimate results excluding high schools that are in regions that are largely rural5 (e.g., 
Essex, Gloucestershire, Lancashire, etc.), where the students’ population is more likely to be homo-
geneous (see Appendix, Table 13). Both these sensitivity tests confirm the main findings. 
As a final sensitivity test, we estimate a model with primary school fixed effects in order to 
take into consideration the common unobserved characteristics of children who attended the same 
primary school (see Appendix, Table 14). Unfortunately, our data do not allow estimating a model 
with high school fixed effects, as we only have one observation of average peer KS3 score for all 
children attending the same high school and therefore there would not be any variation in our main 
variable of interest. The results are consistent with the previous findings from the OLS and IV esti-
mates. Interestingly, in the fixed-effects model, peer ability has a significant effect on the probabil-
ity of attending university. 
Results for other independent variables are reported in Appendix Table 17. Not surprisingly, 
family socioeconomic status (and, in particular, maternal education) is a strong determinant of aca-
demic achievements, and so are previous test scores.  Students from Asian backgrounds and those 
from single-sex schools also seem to perform better in all their exams. 
                                                            
4 We also re-estimate the model limiting the sample to students who have at least 10 peers from the same high school in 
LSYPE. The substantive results are unchanged.  
5 We used the definition of rural areas from the Family Resource Survey data. The complete list of rural areas is: Berk-
shire, Bournemouth, Dorset and Poole, Cambridgeshire, Cheshire and Warrington, County Durham, Cumbria 
Derbyshire, Devon and Cornwall, Essex, Gloucestershire, Hampshire and Isle of Wight, Herefordshire and Worcester-
shire, Hertfordshire, Humberside, Kent and Medway, Lancashire, Leicestershire, Lincolnshire and Rutland, Norfolk, 
North Yorkshire, Northumberland, Shropshire, Somerset, Staffordshire, Suffolk, Sussex, West Yorkshire, West of Eng-
land, Wiltshire and Swindon. 
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Table 5  Quantile Regression of the impact of peers’ quality on GCSE passes 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
# GCSE A*–C Average peers 
quality 




















































































-0.014 (0.032) -0.020 
(0.095) 




Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables in-




Table 6 IV Quantile Regression of the impact of average peers’ quality on GCSE passes – Model 2  
# GCSE A*–C P5 P10 P15 P20 P25  P50 P75 
_b 0.968 0.668 1.231 1.613 0.725 0.092 -0.283 
Mean 1.009 0.842 1.421 1.458 0.961 0.029 -0.179 
Lower bound -0.318 -0.432 0.145 -0.203 -0.449 -0.792 -1.208 
Upper bound 2.234 2.366 3.191 3.171 2.715 0.870 1.145  
Note: Confidence intervals are reported. Results have been estimated with Stata routine cqiv with uncensored option and 50 bootstrap replications. 
 
Table 7   IV Quantile Regression of the impact of % low ability peers on GCSE passes – Model 2 
# GCSE A*–C P5 P10 P15 P20 P25  P50 P75 
_b -0.333 -0.441 -0.266 -0.443 -0.189 -0.151 -0.153  
Mean -0.301 -0.420 -0.362 -0.384 -0.255 -0.170 -0.180  
Lower bound -0.623 -0.646 -0.613 -0.629 -0.541 -0.423 -0.364  
Upper bound 0.034 -0.087 -0.091 -0.092 0.038 0.069 0.041  
Note: Confidence intervals are reported. Results have been estimated with Stata routine cqiv with uncensored option and 50 bootstrap replications. 
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Table 8 -Quantile Regression of the impact of peers’ quality on A level points 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
A-level Average peers % Low quality Average peers % Low quality Average peers % Low quality 
P5 62.882 (4.875)*** -22.084 (2.596)*** 64.9565 (5.050)*** -23.975 (2.447)*** 55.330 (6.155)*** -21.211 (2.616)*** 
P10 60.613 (7.297)*** -16.064 (2.570)*** 61.652 (7.759)*** -15.862 (2.639)*** 57.652 (8.477)*** -17.068 (3.525)*** 
P15 67.271 (6.862)*** -20.735 (3.120)*** 70.917 (6.615)*** -21.747 (2.796)*** 65.018 (7.719)*** -22.216 (3.971)*** 
P20 64.211 (5.875)*** -21.995 (3.080)*** 65.974 (6.237)*** -21.930 (2.854)*** 62.965 (7.728)*** -22.872 (3.567)*** 
P25 63.159 (5.654)*** -21.943 (2.877)*** 62.097 (5.861)*** -21.913 (2.432)*** 57.816 (6.786)*** -21.604 (3.244)*** 
P50 62.882 (4.875)*** -22.084 (2.596)*** 64.956 (5.050)*** -23.975 (2.445)*** 55.330 (6.155)*** -21.211 (2.616)*** 
P75 48.916 (4.727)*** -19.200 (2.547)*** 49.316 (5.461)*** -20.282 (2.486)*** 47.641 (6.931)*** -19.818 (2.684)*** 
Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables in-




Table 9 IV Quantile Regression of the impact of average peers’ quality on A level points – Model 2  
A level points P5 P10 P15 P20 P25 P40 P50 P60 P75 
_b -3.750 45.554 67.669 33.728 29.574 76.649 61.906 55.955 43.184 
Mean 11.959 36.984 64.887 47.381 47.004 71.455 79.560 64.045 56.964 
Lower bound -37.686 -23.068 13.389 -6.027 -20.923 16.712 29.462 12.774 12.596 
Upper bound 66.775 101.735 115.815 112.045 116.093 132.924 131.954 116.603 103.704 
Note: Confidence intervals are reported. Results have been estimated with Stata routine cqiv with uncensored option and 50 bootstrap replications. 
 
Table 10 IV Quantile Regression of the impact of % low quality peers on A level results– Model 2 
A level points P5 P10 P15 P20 P25 P50 P75 
_b 0.933 -7.449 -18.861 -16.498 -15.456 -27.413 -25.117 
Mean 0.875 -8.758 -18.043 -18.982 -18.454 -27.667 -26.905 
Lower bound -9.701 -24.889 -32.963 -34.332 -34.860 -42.359 -43.852 
Upper bound 13.286 5.870 0.151 -4.624 -2.433 -16.707 -11.663 
Note: Confidence intervals are reported. Results have been estimated with Stata routine cqiv with uncensored option and 50 bootstrap replications. 
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Table 11- OLS and IV estimates of the impact of % of low quality peers on A-level perfor-
mance in Maths and Science 
 Model 2 
Outcomes OLS IV F st. 
Having A level in Maths -0.028 (0.007)*** -0.0419 (0.016)*** 80.94 
A level points in Maths -4.4764 (0.932)*** -6.236 (2.106)*** 80.94 
Having A level in Science -0.041 (0.008)*** -0.046 (0.017)*** 80.94 
A levels points in Science -6.717 (1.213)*** -6.529 (2.531)*** 80.94 
Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 
10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables included are listed at p.14-15. 
 
6.      Conclusion 
In this paper, we estimated the effect of peers’ ability in English high schools using data from 
the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) and measuring peers’ ability 
using results in Key Stage 3 test scores at Age 14. While we focused our attention on the ef-
fect of average peers’ ability, we also considered the effect of being in a school with a high 
proportion of low-achieving peers, and we have investigated the effect of peers’ ability across 
the grade distribution using quantile-regression methods. 
 The main contributions of the work are that we analyse peers’ effects on high-stakes 
outcomes at the end of high school using a very rich and recent dataset as well as using a new 
identification strategy based on the peers of peers. Briefly, we use information on primary 
school peers of individual’s high school peers who attended different primary and high 
schools from the individual to instrument average high school’s peers’ ability. Peers of peers 
have never been in school with the individual and therefore could never have had a direct 
effect on her or his achievements. 
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Our findings show that average peers’ ability does have a moderate effect on perfor-
mance in GCSE exams at Age 16, and most of the effect is found for students at the bottom 
of the grade distribution. In particular, being in a school with a high proportion of low-
achieving peers is particularly detrimental for the achievements of students in the bottom 
quartile of the GCSE distribution. 
 Results for A levels are less heterogeneous and show that increased peers’ quality is 
significantly beneficial for all students across the grade distribution. Our results are stable to 
the introduction of a more detailed set of independent variables, including individual, family 
and school characteristics, and robust as well to IV regression and primary school fixed ef-
fects. Our results are broadly consistent with previous findings from the literature and in par-
ticular with Gibbons and Telhai (2015) and Lavy et al. (2012). 
  Our results imply that there are some indications of complementarities between stu-
dents of different abilities. Even if it is particularly complex to draw clear policy implications 
related to students’ ability mixing, we believe that these results show the detrimental effect of 
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Table 12 Sensitivity to excluding students from small high schools (<600 students) 
Model 2 
 Average peers quality % Low quality peers 






































54.322       
(24.395)*** 
12.87 -22.843       
(2.202)*** 



























Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 
10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables included are listed at p.14-15. 
 
Table 13 - Sensitivity to excluding students from rural areas – Model 2 
 Average peers quality % Low quality peers 





































































Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 
10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables included are listed at p.14-15. 
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Table 14 Primary school fixed effects estimates of the effect of peers’ ability on academ-
ic achievements – Model 2 
Outcomes Average peers quality % Low quality peers  
# GCSE A*–C  -0.032 (0.153) -0.176 (0.063)***  
5+ GCSE A*–C 0.00096 (0.021) -0.017 (0.008)**  
Having A levels 0.065 (0.027)*** -0.041 (0.011)***  
A levels Points 34.051 (11.293)*** -23.284 (5.102)***  
Attended University  0.0612 (0.032)* -0.045 (0.013)***  
Russell University -0.046 (0.056) -0.0052 (0.026)  
Note: Std errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 
10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Additional variables included are listed at p.14-15.
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Table 15 - First stage results – Endogenous variable: average peers’ quality (KS3 score) – Model 2 
 5+  GCSE A*-C # GCSE A*-C Having A levels A level Points Attend university Russell university 
Male -0.007 (0.023) -0.007 (0.023) 0.0124 (0.029) 0.030 (0.045) 0.014 (0.032) 0.066 (0.053) 
Imd score -0.010 (0.001)*** -0.010 (0.001)*** -0.010 (0.000)*** -0.012 (0.001)*** -0.011 (0.001)*** -0.010 (0.001)*** 
KS2 score 0.140 (0.018) *** 0.140 (0.018)***         
5+ GCSE A*-C     0.217 (0.026)*** 0.197 (0.030)***     
Taking A levels         0.195 (0.026)***   
A level Points           0.001 (0.000)*** 
Maternal Uni 
degree 0.200 (0.033) *** 0.200 (0.033)*** 0.239 (0.039)*** 0.250 (0.049)*** 0.244 (0.040)*** 0.186 (0.044)*** 
Other HE qual 
0.095 (0.023) *** 0.095 (0.023)*** 0.131 (0.027)*** 0.167 (0.038)*** 0.140 (0.029)*** 0.158 (0.043)*** 
Senior high 
school graduate 0.065 (0.023)*** 0.065 (0.023)*** 0.099 (0.027)*** 0.119 (0.042)*** 0.112 (0.030)*** 0.140 (0.050)*** 
Junior high 
school graduate 0.014 (0.018) 0.014 (0.018) 0.031 (0.021) 0.037 (0.032) 0.034 (0.023) 0.047 (0.042)*** 
Level 1 or below 0.011 (0.022) 0.011 (0.022) 0.010 (0.029) 0.018 (0.044) 0.015 (0.032) 0.037 (0.063) 
Other qual 0.040 (0.033) 0.040 (0.033) 0.058 (0.041) 0.159 (0.064)** 0.071 (0.043)* 0.148 (0.086)* 
Mother self-emp 0.028 (0.026) 0.028 (0.026) 0.019 (0.031) 0.023 (0.044) 0.015 (0.032) 0.045 (0.054) 
Mother unemp -0.047 (0.039) -0.047 (0.039) -0.091 (0.051)* -0.061 (0.076) -0.101 (0.051)** -0.035 (0.111) 
Mother out of 
labour force -0.041 (0.016)** -0.041 (0.016)*** -0.055 (0.020)*** -0.043 (0.026)* -0.069 (0.023)*** -0.051 (0.032) 
Father self-emp 0.036 (0.016)** 0.036 (0.016)** 0.032 (0.020)* 0.038 (0.027) 0.030 (0.021) 0.009 (0.032) 
Father unemp 0.016 (0.033) 0.016 (0.033) 0.026 (0.037) -0.006 (0.054) 0.022 (0.042) -0.001 (0.077) 
Father out of 
labour force -0.009 (0.016) -0.009 (0.016) -0.024 (0.020) -0.025 (0.028) -0.022 (0.022) -0.082 (0.036)** 
Mother di-
vorced 0.017 (0.019) 0.017 (0.019) 0.029 (0.024) 0.043 (0.042) 0.037 (0.027) 0.093 (0.051)* 
Mother widow 0.016 (0.039) 0.016 (0.039) 0.021 (0.047) 0.115 (0.060)* 0.030 (0.050) 0.051 (0.080) 
Maternal age 0.004 (0.001)*** 0.004 (0.001) 0.004 (0.001)*** 0.005 (0.002)*** 0.005 (0.001)*** 0.005 (0.002)*** 
Peers of peers 
average KS2 0.125 (0.028)*** 0.125 (0.028)*** 0.143 (0.033)*** 0.157 (0.044)*** 0.147 (0.034)*** 0.176 (0.044)*** 
F stat 20.53  20.53  18.77  13.06  18.38 16.23  
Note: standard errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. 
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Table 16 - First stage results – Endogenous variable: % of Peers not achieving basic standards in KS3 Mathematics – Model 2 
 5+ GCSE A*-C # GCSE A*-C Having A levels  A level Points Attend university Russell university 
Male 0.011 (0.043) 0.011 (0.043) -0.033 (0.053) -0.056 (0.072) -0.039 (0.056) -0.112 (0.084) 
Imd score 0.031 (0.002)*** 0.031 (0.002)*** 0.031 (0.002)*** 0.033 (0.003)*** 0.032 (0.002)*** 0.031 (0.003)*** 
KS2 score -0.321 (0.043)*** -0.321 (0.043)***         
5+ GCSE  
A*-C     -0.492 (0.060) -0.408 (0.067)***   
  
Taking  
A levels         -0.421 (0.059)*** 
  
A level Points           -0.002 (0.000)*** 
Maternal Uni 
degree -0.380 (0.064)*** -0.380 (0.064)*** -0.471 (0.066)*** -0.465 (0.081)*** -0.478 (0.067)*** -0.335 (0.092)*** 
Other higher 
education -0.253 (0.056)*** -0.253 (0.056)*** -0.335 (0.063)*** -0.371 (0.078)*** -0.349 (0.066)*** -0.291 (0.096)*** 
Senior high 
school graduate -0.179 (0.059)*** -0.179 (0.059)*** -0.253 (0.065)*** -0.297 (0.086)*** -0.282 (0.070)*** -0.254 (0.111)*** 
Junior high 
school graduate -0.096 (0.049)** -0.096 (0.049)** -0.125 (0.057)*** -0.132 (0.075)* -0.116 (0.061)* -0.134 (0.098) 
Level 1 or below -0.069 (0.058) -0.069 (0.058) -0.077 (0.072)** -0.151 (0.101) -0.076 (0.078) -0.185 (0.140) 
Other qualifica-
tion -0.028 (0.087) -0.028 (0.087) 0.069 (0.111) -0.147 (0.140) 0.014 (0.115) -0.094 (0.183) 
             
Mother self-emp -0.001 (0.049) -0.001 (0.049) 0.006 (0.057) 0.060 (0.075) 0.022 (0.059) -0.013 (0.099) 
Mother unemp 0.244 (0.112)** 0.244 (0.112)** 0.305 (0.146)** 0.092 (0.181) 0.331 (0.151)** 0.077 (0.245) 
Mother out of the 
labour force 0.204 (0.045)** 0.204 (0.045)** 0.247 (0.056)** 0.212 (0.055)*** 0.280 (0.061)*** 0.253 (0.069) 
Father self-
employed -0.069 (0.037)* -0.069 (0.037)* -0.046 (0.043) -0.038 (0.051) -0.043 (0.045) 0.045 (0.061) 
Father unem-
ployed 0.036 (0.087) 0.036 (0.087) -0.016 (0.094) 0.040 (0.134) 0.015 (0.103) 0.155 (0.178) 
Father out of the 
labour force 0.016 (0.043) 0.016 (0.043) 0.036 (0.051) 0.012 (0.064) 0.031 (0.056) 0.124 (0.082) 
Mother is di-
vorced 0.012 (0.048) 0.012 (0.048) -0.022 (0.061) -0.052 (0.090) -0.046 (0.065) -0.107 (0.114) 
Mother is a wid-
ow -0.032 (0.099) -0.032 (0.099) 0.040 (0.117) -0.106 (0.136) 0.024 (0.131) 0.072 (0.190) 
Maternal age -0.007 (0.003)*** -0.007 (0.003)*** -0.008 (0.003)*** -0.007 (0.004)*** -0.009 (0.004)*** -0.008 (0.005) 
% Peers of peers 
not basic Maths 0.278 (0.033)*** 0.278 (0.033)*** 0.300 (0.035)*** 0.318 0.039 0.304 (0.036) 0.312 (0.043)*** 
F stat 71.33  71.33  71.58  65.12  72.12  52.99  
Note: standard errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. 
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Table 17 – Results from OLS regression for the effect of other independent variables - Model 2 
 #GCSE A*-C 5+ GCSE A*-C Having A levels A level Points 
Attend 
university Russell university 
Male -0.061 (0.008)*** -0.832(0.069)*** -0.044 (0.010)*** -18.026 (3.978)*** -0.033 (0.011)*** 0.023 (0.017) 
Imd score -0.002(0.000)*** -0.007 (0.003)** -0.000 (0.000) 0.015 (0.148) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 
KS2 score 0.287 (0.005)*** 2.663 (0.037)***     
5+ GCSE A*-C   0.493 (0.012)*** 131.428 (4.855)***   
Taking A levels     0.347 (0.013)***  
A level Points      0.002 (0.000)*** 













Other higher education 0.025 (0.015) 0.170 (0.123) 0.049 (0.019)*** 6.197 (7.552) -0.011 (0.021) 0.022(0.032) 
Senior high school grad 0.004 (0.016) -0.041 (0.127) 0.001(0.019) -2.646 (6.887) -0.024 (0.022) -0.025 (0.033) 
Junior high school grad -0.033 (0.012)*** -0.314 (0.107)*** 0.010(0.016) -9.315 (6.415) -0.053 (0.017)*** -0.073 (0.027)*** 
Level 1 or below -0.056 (0.017)*** -0.608 (0.147)*** -0.065 (0.021)*** -42.563 (9.660)*** -0.054 (0.026)** -0.053 (0.041) 
Other qualification -0.070 (0.026)*** -0.285 (0.205) 0.031 (0.033) 7.238 (12.080) -0.019 (0.036) -0.070 (0.049) 
Mother self-employed -0.006 (0.017) -0.066 (0.128) -0.018 (0.022) 4.976 (7.604) -0.024 (0.025) 0.012 (0.036) 
Mother unemployed -0.027 (0.030) -0.322 (0.232) -0.018 (0.039) 8.665 (18.515) -0.021 (0.039) -0.069 (0.062) 
Mother out of labour force 0.026 (0.011)** 0.190 (0.085)** 0.033 (0.013)*** 12.670 (5.169)** -0.014 (0.015) -0.011 (0.021) 
Father self-employed 0.006 (0.011) 0.052 (0.084) -0.009 (0.014) -5.741 (4.628) -0.012 (0.017) 0.007 (0.023) 
Father unemployed -0.026 (0.023) 0.234 (0.214) 0.004 (0.031) 4.111 (12.215) -0.104 (0.032)*** -0.002(0.054) 
Father out of  labour force -0.052 (0.012)*** -0.733 (0.097)*** -0.058 (0.014)*** -26.636 (5.817)*** -0.049(0.017)*** -0.015 (0.028) 
Mother is divorced -0.025 (0.015)* -0.180 (0.117) -0.036 (0.017)** -2.429 (7.673) -0.026 (0.020) 0.008 (0.033) 
Mother is a widow 0.023 (0.031) 0.307 (0.268) 0.027 (0.039) 4.966 (12.380) -0.020 (0.046) 0.114 (0.073) 
Maternal age 0.004 (0.001)*** 0.039 (0.006)*** 0.005 (0.001)*** 1.839 (0.379)*** 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.002) 
Note: standard errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. 
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Table 18 – Results from OLS regression for the effect of other independent variables - Model 3 
 N. GCSE A*-C 5+ GCSE A*-C Having A levels A level Points Attend university Russell university 
Male -0.058 (0.008)*** -0.819 (0.067)*** -0.041 (0.010)*** -16.798 (3.991)*** -0.034 (0.011)*** 0.023 (0.017) 
Imd score -0.002  (0.000)*** -0.015 (0.003)*** -0.001 (0.000)** -0.205 (0.155) -0.002 (0.000)*** -0.000 (0.001) 
KS2 score 0.288 (0.005)*** 2.656 (0.037)***     
5+ GCSE A*-C   0.485 (0.012)*** 130.789 (5.035)***   
Taking A levels     0.328 (0.013)***  
A level Points      0.002 (0.000)*** 
Mixed gender school -0.004 (0.017) 0.048 (0.158) -0.044 (0.017)*** -16.494 (6.300)*** -0.018 (0.019) -0.023 (0.026) 
Asian 0.133 (0.014)*** 1.491 (0.136)*** 0.114 (0.015)*** 19.448 (6.585)*** 0.150 (0.017)*** 0.047 (0.023)** 
Black 0.026 (0.022) 0.635 (0.189)*** -0.003 (0.027) -2.158 (8.608) 0.086 (0.028)*** 0.037 (0.040) 
Religious schools 0.036 (0.016)** 0.096 (0.148) 0.010 (0.017) -3.262 (6.237) 0.017 (0.020) 0.010 (0.028) 
Total n. students 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.006) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 













Other higher education 0.061 (0.015)*** 0.554 (0.120)*** 0.088 (0.019)*** 14.881 (7.987)* 0.039 (0.022)* 0.044 (0.032) 
Senior high school graduate 0.046 (0.016)*** 0.370 (0.122)*** 0.041 (0.020)** 6.786 (7.475) 0.032 (0.022) -0.010 (0.034) 
Junior high school graduate 0.009 (0.012) 0.122 (0.099) 0.050 (0.016)*** 0.113 (6.898) 0.002 (0.018) -0.061 (0.028)** 
Level 1 or below -0.008 (0.018) -0.133 (0.143) -0.029 (0.021) -34.494 (9.846)*** -0.001 (0.026) -0.042 (0.041) 
Other qualification -0.044 (0.026)* 0.010 (0.197) 0.053 (0.033) 13.270 (12.479) 0.014 (0.036) -0.059 (0.050) 
Mother self-employed -0.007 (0.017) -0.074 (0.126) -0.013 (0.022) 4.754 (7.741) -0.021 (0.025) 0.014 (0.037) 
Mother unemployed -0.041 (0.030) -0.393 (0.228)* -0.007(0.040) 6.057 (18.523) -0.033 (0.039) -0.049 (0.065) 
Mother out of the labour 
force 
-0.000 (0.011) -0.076 (0.082) 0.015 (0.013) 8.464 (5.342) -0.035 (0.015)** -0.009 (0.021) 
Father self-employed 0.000 (0.011) -0.025 (0.082) -0.017 (0.014) -6.456 (4.714) -0.017 (0.017) 0.009 (0.023) 
Father unemployed -0.044 (0.023)* 0.080 (0.213) -0.001 (0.030) 1.832 (11.815) -0.129 (0.032)*** 0.016 (0.055) 
Father out of the labour 
force 
-0.051 (0.012)*** -0.703 (0.094)*** -0.050 (0.015)*** -26.348 (5.873)*** -0.050 (0.016)*** -0.014 (0.029) 
Mother is divorced -0.016 (0.015) -0.101 (0.116) -0.033 (0.018)* 0.095 (7.691) -0.011 (0.020) 0.004 (0.034) 
Mother is a widow 0.013 (0.031) 0.172 (0.260) 0.013 (0.039) 2.978 (12.557) -0.040 (0.044) 0.117 (0.072) 
Maternal age 0.004 (0.001)*** 0.038 (0.006)*** 0.005 (0.001)*** 1.902 (0.386)*** 0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.002) 
Note: standard errors are in brackets. * indicates that the underlying coefficient is significant at 10% level, ** at 5% and ***1%. Coefficients of Government Office 
Regions are available on request 
 
 
